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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a memorandum decision entered on
May

11, 1992 and an order

thereon

entered

on July

15, 1992

amending the December 12, 1991 decree of divorce to award attorney
fees directly to plaintiff's counsel.
Jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal lies in the Utah
Court

of Appeals pursuant

to the provisions of section 78-2a-

3(2)(h). Utah Code Annotated, which provides the following:
The
Court
of
Appeals
has
appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
. . .
appeals from district court
involving domestic relations cases, including but not
limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney

fees directly to trial counsel and, if so, whether such error is
harmless.
II.

Whether the trial court viol at ed defendant's right

to procedural due process in entering its memorandum decision of
May 11, 1992.
III.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

granting

plaintiff's January 28, 1992 Rule 60 motion.
IV.

Whether the entry by the trial court of its May

11, 1992 memorandum decision was an abuse of discretion.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
1

1.

The constitution of the state of Utah, article I,

section 7, provides that:
No person shal1 be deprived of 1 ife, !iberty or
property, without due process of law.
2.

Utah

Code

Annotated, Section

30-3-3, as amended

1953, provides the following:
The court may order either party to pay to the
clerk a sum of money for the separate support and
maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
3.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-51-41, as amended

1989, provides the following:
The compensation of an attorney and counselor
for services is governed by agreement, express or
implied, which is not restrained by law.
From the
commencement of an action, or the service of an answer
containing a counterclaim or at the time that the
attorney and client enter into a written or oral
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has
a lien upon the client/s cause of action or counterclaim,
which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report,
decision, or judgment in the client's favor and to the
proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties
before or after judgment.
Any written employment
agreement shall contain a statement that the attorney has
a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim.
4.

Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

Every action shall be prosecuted, in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator,
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the party
for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a
statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought in the name of the state of
Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after

2

objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of the real party in
interest;
and
such
ratification,
joinder
, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action
had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest.
5.

Rule

54(c)(1),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

provides that:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded * such
relief in his pleadings* It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate
rights of the parties on each side as between or among
themse1ves.
6.

Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

that:
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment.
7..

Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

that:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the
court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
8.

Rule 4-501(l)(d), Code of Judicial Administration

provides that:
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the
Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decisionThe notification shall be in the form of a separate

3

written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for
Decision". The notification shall contain a certificate
of mailing to all partiesIf neither party files a
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
9.

Rule 4~501(3)(a)t Code of Judicial Administration

provides that:
A decision on a motion shal1 be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b)
or (4) below- [emphasis added]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a divorce actionprotracted
decree

district

court

proceedings, the

resolving custody, visitation

Subsequent to

court

rendered

and property

which included an award of attorney fees.

its

distribution

Defendant's counsel,

contrary to direct instructions from the court, refused to forward
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to trial
counsel

for approval

refusal,

entered

defendant-

as to form.

the

final

decree

The court, unaware of
in

the

form

presented

this
by

Upon being made aware of the entry of the decree,

plaintiff moved the court for relief as it related to attorney fees
for trial counsel-

On May 11, 1992 the court entered its order

granting attorney fees to plaintiff's counsel-

Defendant appeals-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March

28, 1991, trial

in the

instant

action

terminated with the court ruling, inter alia, that defendant pay
attorney fees in the amount of $7,500.00-

4

2.

Subsequently, ana on a continuing basis, differences

arising over the form of the findings, decree and other matters
continued by motion, response, and occasional

order and amended

decree.
3.

On October 9, 1991 the court rendered its memorandum

decision (exhibit A) containing its ruling on plaintiffs
16,

1991

objections

conclusions

of

to defendant's proposed

law and

judgment

(filed

August

findings of fact,

August

20, 1991) and

specifically directing that:
Counsel
for defendant is to prepare new
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing
Counsel for approval as to form and then to the court for
signature* [emphasis added]
4.

On October 21, 1991 defendant's counsel was informed

that:
Inasmuch as I have not heard from you regarding
the preparation of new findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment as directed by Judge Noel in his
memorandum decision of October 9, 1991, I wish to notify
you that, unless payment in full of the amounts awarded
as attorney fees are made prior to November 1, 1991, I
will cause execution to issue to obtain such funds from
your client. (R. 1022)
5.

On

October

25,

1991

defendant's

counsel,

notwithstanding the court's order that any findings of fact and
conclusions

of

law and

judgement

be

submitted

to

plaintiff's

counsel responded by stating:
I have been dealing with Mr. Watts on this
matter since he entered an appearance in this case. He
related tome that you have refused to file a withdrawal.
If you feel I should be dealing with you on the case,
please advise and let me see something from one of you
signed by Tamera McDonald stating which of you represents
her. (R. 1023)

5

6.

On

October

26,

1991, and

in

response

to

the

foregoing, defendant's counsel was informed as follows:
I read with great surprise your letter of
October 25, 1991. Please oe advised that I am counsel of
record and, unless and until you are advised otherwise by
me, will remain so.
I believe the rules specify that, in the event
a party is represented by more than one attorney, you are
obligated to provide notice of your activities to ooth.
To the extent that you have communicated with
other counsel without notifying me. please forward to me
any and all documents involved in such communication and
inform me (in writing) of the time, date and content of
any oral communications with Mr. Watts to which I was not
a party. (R. 1024)
7.

On Octooer 30, 1991, notwithstanding the failure of

defendant to submit same to plaintiff's trial counsel for approval
as ordered by the court, the initial decree of divorce was entered,
paragraph 14 thereof providing:
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant
in the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($7,500.00) as attorney's fees. (R. 920)
8.

On Decemoer 12, 1991 an amended decree of divorce

was entered, paragraph 14 thereof providing:
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant
in the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
(37,500.00) as attorney's fees. (R. 989)
9.

On January 28, 1992, plaintiff filed her Rule 60

motion for stay of entry of order and to set aside judgment re
attorney fees.
10.

(R. 1016/1024).
On February 5, 1992, defendant filed his response to

plaintiff's above referenced Rule 60 motion, stating therein that:
The Decree that has carried the language upon
which the Court has ruled was reviewed by Mr. Guyon over
6

a considerable period of time; it was a decree to which
he made numerous objections, but at no time did he make
objections to the language with which he now disagrees,
[emphasis added] (R. 1026)
11*

On April 6, 1992 plaintiff, and in compliance with

the requirements of Rule 4-501(d) notified
referenced Rule 60 motion was submitted
decision,

the court that

to the court

the

for

its

entered

its

(Exhibit B)
12.

On

May

11,

1992

the

trial

court

memorandum decision stating in relevant part that:
The Court has reviewed the entire history regarding this
"Attorney/s Fees'1 matter and now enters an Order
disposing of these motions and resolving the issue of
plaintiffs attorneys fees.
The Court previously entered a minute entry dated
the 16th day of January, 1992 indicating that Mr. Guyon
should look to plaintiff for payment of his attorneys
fees. That opinion was based on the precise wording of
the decree of divorce which stated:
"Plaintiff
is
awarded
judgment
against defendant in the sum of $7,500.00
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) as
attorneys fees."
The Court is of the opinion that the precise
wording of the Decree required that result.
Mr. Guyon has now filed a Motion to Set Aside
that judgment relating to attorneys fees relying on Rule
60 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
After reviewing the entire matter, including
portions of the court transcript cited by the parties,
and the court's notes together with
the Courts
recollection of this matter, the Court is oCof] the
opinion that Mr. Guyon's motion is well taken. It was
and is the Court's intent that Mr. Guyon be given a
judgment for attorneys fees for services rendered up to
the time of the court's order awarding attorneys fees.
The technical language that finally emerged in this
matter (although the specific issue here presented was
not addressed earlier) granted the judgment in favor of
plaintiff rather than to Mr. Guyon. (R. 1068/1069)

7

13•

On July 15, 1992 the court, based upon the iMay 11,

1992 memorandum decision entered its amendment to judgment stating:
CI It is hereby ordered that said December 12, 1991 decree
be and hereby is amended to provide, in lieu of payment
of attorney fees directly to plaintiff, as follows:
Defendant shall pay directly to Edwin F. Guyon
as counsel for plaintiff, as attorney fees,
the sum of $7,500.00. (R. 1207/1208)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court did not err

fees directly to trial counsel.

in awarding attorney

If such award was error, such

error is harmless.
2*

The trial court did not violate defendants right to

procedural due process in entering its memorandum decision of May
11, 1992.
3,

The trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's

January 28, 1992 Rule 60 motion.
4,

The entry by the trial court of its May 11, 1992

memorandum decision was not an abuse of discretion.

ISSUE I -- ERROR, IF ANY IN ENTERING ORDER
AWARDING FEES DIRECTLY TO ATTORNEY, WAS HARMLESS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

An appellate court reviewing cases in equity has the

duty and prerogative, where warranted, but only upon a full review
of fact and law, to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
trial

court

with

the caveat

should not be disturbed

except

that the trial
to prevent

8

court's action

manifest

injustice.

Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Jackson v. Jackson,
617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980); Mitchel1 v. Mitchel1 . 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah
1974).
2.

The burden is upon the appellant to prove that the

evidence clearly preponderates against the findings as made; or
there was a misunderstanding or misapp1icat i on of the 1 aw resu11 ing
in substantial

and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has

resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.

Mitchel1 v.

Mitchel1 . 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974); Harding v. Harding. 488
P.2d 308 (Utah 1971): Searle v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).
PARTIES IN INTEREST
3.

The

purpose

of

Rule

17,

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure, and the reason the defendant has the right to have a
cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so that
the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another
and permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims
available against the real owner of the cause.

Shaw v. Jeppson,

239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952)
4.

The provisions of Rule 54(c)(1) are consistent with

the general principle that a trial court may not render judgment in
favor of a nonparty.
adjudication
action.

only

Courts can generally make a legally binding

between

the

parties

actually

joined

in the

Hiltslev v. Ryder. 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).
ATTORNEY FEES
5*

Early

in Utah family

law jurisprudence

the Utah

Supreme Court took the position that a decree in favor of a party / s
9

attorney was void for lack of jurisdiction-

Openshaw v. Openshaw,

12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 1932); Rolando v. District Court, 271 P. 225
(Utah ) ; Brown v. Brown, 8 P.2d 452 (Ariz ) and concluded that the
decree should be amended so as to make it run in favor of the party
to the case, Qpenshaw, supra.
6,

When

issues arising over payment

Openshaw attorney gave rise to additional

of fees to the

litigation, the Utah

Supreme Court rejected Openshaw"s argument that an improper remedy,
i.e. an action in conversion, was sought and declared such a claim
without merit, relying on Section 104-1-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1943
which provides:
There is in this state but one form of civil
action for the enforcement or protection of private
rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs.
and held that:
Under this section this court has held that a
pleader is not required to follow any particular form or
special theory in stating the facts, and if the facts
stated entitled plaintiff to any relief under the
substantive law, then he has stated what is termed "a
good cause of action", and the court must enter judgment
in his favor so far as any attack upon the sufficiency of
the pleading is concerned. Williams v. Ne1 son, 145 P.
39, 41 (Utah ); Hanson v. Openshaw, 155 P.2d 410, 411-12
(Utah 1945).
7.

Subsequently the Utah Supreme Court has taken the

position that:
In the absence of a statute, let it be conceded
that an attorney in a divorce action has no lien either
on the cause of action or on the judgment or on the
proceeds thereof in favor of his client, but in this
state we have an attorney's lien statute. It, R.S. Utah
1933, 6-0-40, provides: "The compensation of an attorney
and counselor for his services is governed by agreement,
express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From
the commencement of an action, or the service of an
10

answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attached to a verdict,
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and to
the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come,
and cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment. Hampton v. Hampton. 32
P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 1945).
and further, that:
Under such a statute, we think the weight of
authority (citations omitted), at least on principle, is
to the effect that the lien attaches in all cases,
including divorce actions. Id.
8.

It has been held, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d

1331, 1336 (Utah App 1988) that:
A trial court has the power to award attorney
fees in divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah Cod Ann.
section 30-3-3 (1984). Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384
(Utah 1980). The decision to make such an award and the
amount thereof rest primarily in the sound discretion of
the trial court. J_d. However, the award must be based
on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness.
Beals v. Beals. 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984).
9.

In Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970, 971

(Utah 1966), an action in which a non-party attorney appealed an
order quashing a writ of garnishment, the Supreme Court, stating
that the proper procedure would be for the attorney to intervene
for the purpose of determining the amount and extent of his lien
and then have it enforced, concluded that, under the circumstances,
the attorney had no standing and dismissed the appeal.
HARMLESS ERROR/UTAH
10.

Rule 61 places upon appellant the burden of showing

not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and
prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a
full and fair consideration of the disputed issue by the finder of
11

fact. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); Onveabor v. Pro
Roofing. Inc. . 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Civ App 1990).
11.

When parties have been afforded an opportunity to

present their claims to a court or jury in a fair trial and a
verdict and judgment is entered, all presumptions are in favor of
the validity of the verdict and judgment.

Joseph v. V.H. Groves

Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1966).
12.

Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a

presumption arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless
the one attacking it meets the requirement of showing that the
error is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different in
absence of such error.
13.
that

any

Hal 1 v. Blackman, 417 P.2d 664 (1966).

Since the appellant has the burden of demonstrating

error

has

reasonable presumption

affected

his

substantial

rights, every

in favor of the validity

of a general

verdict must be taken as true on appeal . Leigh Furniture & Carpet
Company v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
14.

A party who takes a position that leads a court into

error, or who by conduct approves the error committed by the court,
cannot later take advantage of the error in procedure.

He 1 man v.

Paterson, 241 P.2d 910 (Utah 1952).
15.
mere

error,

prejudicial.
16.

An appellate court will not reverse a judgment for
unless

the

error

involved

Is

substantial

and

Kesler v. Rogers. 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975.
An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
12

different outcome is high enough to undermine confidence
verdict-

in the

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah

1991).
HARMLESS ERROR/OTHER JURISDICTIONS
17.
similar

In actions in other jurisdictions in which questions

to those of

the

instant

action, an approach

has been

followed that declares the matter to be generally harmless:
The husband's argument that it was error for
the court to order the payment of fees directly to the
wife's attorney is well-founded. The case of Louthian
andMerritt. P.A. v. Davis. 272 S.C. 330, 251 S.E.2d. 757
(1979), disapproves of this method of awarding attorney's
fees. In Louthian and Merritt, P.A., supra, our Supreme
Court stated that because a claim for attorney's fees
incidental to a divorce action is purely personal, they
are to be awarded to the litigant and not to the
attorney.
The trial court erred, then, in awarding
attorney's fees directly to the wife's attorney; however,
the error in their award is not reversible because no
prejudice to the husband has been shown, [citations
omitted]
The award of attorney's fees, therefore, is
affirmed. Re i d v. Re i d, 312 S.E.2d 724, 730 (S.C.App
1984)
18.

The above decision is based in substantial part upon

an earlier South Carolina case in which the court stated:
In his final exception, the husband contends
that the lower court erred in directing that the
attorneys' fees be paid directly to the attorneys. Code
Section 20-112 provides that the court may allow the wife
suit money. Counsel for the husband argues that an order
granting payment directly to the attorneys is void. The
wife's attorneys acknowledge ". . . that the preferred
practice is to order attorneys' fees paid to the party,
• • .." Traditionally in this State, in divorce actions
fees have been ordered paid directly to counsel.
Normally, there is no reason to contest such payment and
this Court is not aware of any evils growing out of the
pract ice.
In the original order, the trial judge provided
for "a reasonable attorneys' fee to be paid to her
attorneys for defending the action."
This apparently
13

caused no concern on the first appeal, nor at the hearing
on remand.
The principle is we I 1 settled that error is not
reversible unless prejudice to the complaining party may
have resulted therefrom.
Assuming error in directing that the fees be
paid directly to the attorneys, no prejudice to the
husband has been shown. The wife testified in the court
below in behalf of the motion of her attorneys, whereby
they sought payment and ". . . a n order setting a
reasonable attorneys'' fee for the undersigned attorneys
. . ." Neither the husband nor the wife is in a position
to complain, and a reversal on this ground is not
required, [emphasis added] Darden v. Witham, 209 S.E.2nd
42, 47 (S.C. 1974).
19.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Owens v. Owens,

264 P.2d 341 (Okla 1953), an action in which the appellant contends
that an attorney fee allowance is void on account of the manner in
which it was stated in the judgment reasoned as follows:
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed
by the court that the plaintiff, 0.0. Owens, pay to said
attorneys on or before March 1, 1945, the said sum of
$2,000.00 and that plaintiff also pay the costs of this
action.
[the attorneys issued an execution
on the above
judgment, in response to which plaintiff filed a motion
to quash]
Upon application and hearing the court granted
a nunc pro tunc order correcting the judgment so that as
to the attorneys fees item it should read as a judgment
"against the plaintiff 0.0. owens and in favor of the
defendant Ester Webb Owens, for the use and benefit of
defendants attorneys H.L. Smith and Guy S. Manatt.
Plaintiff contends that the judgment for
attorneys fees as stated in the original judgment, or as
stated in the nunc pro tunc order is void as being a
judgment in favor of persons not parties to the action,
and contends that any order directing payment to the
attorneys is void, [emphasis added]
[the court distinguished on the
California judgment]
14

law a case

involving

This court has never held that an attorney's
fee allowance in a divorce case was void if ordered to be
paid direct to the attorney. We have always taken a view
contrary to California, because we have held that the
attorneys for the wife in a divorce have a personal
interest in the allowance of attorneys fees to the extent
that the attorneys may in their own name enforce the
payment of the same to themselves and for their own
private benefit, though the wife does not participate in
such proceedings with the attorneys, and though the wife
might in fact be antagonistic to such enforcement by the
attorneys, [citations omitted]
This court has, over many years, recognized the
validity of allowances of attorneys fees in divorce cased
when the language used by the Judge and written in the
journal entry named the attorneys in various ways, and in
some cases where it referred to them, but did not name
them, [citations omitted] Owens, supra.. at 341-342.
20.

Subsequent to an extensive analysis of prior cases

in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court rehearsed the history of its
position and made the following determination:
In view of this well defined and well
established policy in Oklahoma it is of but scant
importance whether we uphold the order made in the
subsequent proceedings, or uphold the original trial
order when this fee al lowance was first ordered and made.
Either way the plaintiff, husband, should pay the award
made.
If there was any error in the verbiage of the
first order it was an irregularity only. It could have
been corrected in drafting and approving the journal
entry if either party had thought it of sufficient
importance.
The fact remains that the original trial judge
intended to make, and did make an attorneys fee allowance
against the husband. Every one understood it and no one
questioned the fairness of the amount or the authority of
the court to make such an allowance against the husband.
There was acquiescence in the order and compliance with
it to the extent of paying $200 thereof, and the balance
should be paid as ordered by the court.
The plaintiff contends the order was void on
account of the use of the names of the attorneys in the
manner they were used in the journal entry.
but to
15

sustain that contention we must depart from the policy
employed in many former cases and over a long period of
years. It is not pointed out that any harm or evil has
resulted form the application of this policy in any one
of the many former cases , nor that harm or injury will
result from its application in this case.
Our policy authorizes attorneys in their own
names to enforce attorneys fee awards in proper cases, as
above cited, on the theory that they have individual or
vested interests therein. Then of course it is logical
to uphold orders which refer to them or name them as we
have done in several above cited cases.
We conclude the plaintiff was not entitled to
have the execution quashed. The court properly denied
his motion to quash. Id. f at 346.
21.

In the event the court committed error, said error

was harmless, there being no prejudice alleged or shown.

ISSUE II — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN ENTERING ITS MAY 11, 1992 ORDER
1.

In the state of Utah, "Timely and adequate notice

and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very
heart of procedural fairness."

Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,

1211 (Utah 1983).
2.

While

Utah

law recognizes

both

procedural

and

substantive due process standards, Wells v. Children's Aid Society
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) the only claim by defendant
herein relates to procedural due process, the general test for
which is "fairness" in providing for notice and opportunity to be
heard. Id., at 204.
3.

The much cited case of Mullane v. Central Hanover

Bank & Trust, 399 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), adopted by the Utah Supreme
16

Court, sets out the classic requirements of adequate notice:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections*
The notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information,
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance, [citations omitted] Id. , at
1212.
and further states:
Many cases have held that where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature
of the proceedings against him or not given sufficiently
in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a
party is deprived of due process. Id.
4.

In an action involving the termination of parental

rights, the Utah Supreme Court determined that:
Impl icit in the due process clause of our state
Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing to
determine their rights under the law.
Gribble v.
Cribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978).
5.
of

The record is clear that defendant received a copy

plaintiff's

rule

60

motion

filed

January

28,

1992

(R.

1016/1024); filed his response in the form of a motion to dismiss
(R. 1025/1027); received a notice to submit for decision (Ex. A ) ;
and

received

a

copy

of

the

court's

memorandum

decision

(R.

1068/1070)
6.

The procedures followed by the court comply, in all

aspects, with the applicable procedural rules.

Rule 4-501(3)(a)

permits the court to enter its decision without a hearing unless
requested by one of the parties.

Defendant failed to request a

hearing on this motion and waived his right to complain on appeal
17

that the absence of a hearing violates his right to due process*

ISSUE III — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S JANUARY
28, 1992 RULE 60 MOTION
1.
court

Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the

to grant relief

for any one of the six specific and one

general reasons stated if filed within a reasonable time (3 months
after entry for specific reasons 1 through 4 ) .

The period from

October 10, 1991 to January 30, 1992 is three months*

The motion

was filed January 28, 1992, less than three months subsequent to
the entry of the initial judgment, let alone the subsequent amended
judgments.
2.

Rule 59 applies, if at all, only

in allegations

relating to "newly discovered evidence", a claim not at issue in
the instant action.
court

The motion was filed as a rule 60 motion; the

treated plaintiffs motion

as a rule 60 motion; and the

motion itself requests relief contemplated under rule 60.
3.
present

When parties have been afforded an opportunity to

their claims to a court or jury

in a fair trial

and a

verdict and judgment is entered, all presumptions are in favor of
the validity of the verdict and judgment.

Joseph v. W.H. Groves

Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1966).
4.

Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a

presumption arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless
the one attacking

it meets the requirement of showing that the

error is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is
18

reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different in
absence of such error.
5*
that

any

Since the appellant has the burden of demonstrating

error

reasonable

Hal 1 v. 31ackman, 417 P.2d 664 (1966)*

has

affected

presumption

his

in favor

substantial

of

the

verdict must be taken as true on appeal.

rights,

validity

of

every

a general

Leigh Furniture 8* Carpet

Company v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

ISSUE IV — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
JANUARY 28, 1992 RULE 60 MOTION
1.

The court's October

clearly directs the defendant

9,

1991 memorandum

decision

to forward proposed findings and

judgment to plaintiff's trial counsel -- a requirement not met by
defendant-

The October 21/26, 1992 correspondence

that defendant's position was not

inadvertent*

demonstrates

It is further

relevant that defendant's February 5, 1992 response to plaintiff's
motion purports that the decree was in fact reviewed by plaintiff's
counse1.
2.

A party who takes a position that leads a court into

error, or who by conduct approves the error committed by the court,
cannot later take advantage of the error in procedure.

He 1 man v.

Paterson. 241 P.2d 910 (Utah 1952).
•3.

Plaintiff

adopts the reasoning

in the

foregoing

sections in further support against a holding that the court abused
its discretion in the instant action.

19

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff, in retaining as trial counsel, Edwin F. Guyon,
and entering into an agreement for his employment created

by

virtue of section 78-51-41, U.C.A. and cases thereunder

an

unrestrained lien for attorney fees on his behalf.
At the conclusion of trial an award of $7,500.00 for
attorney fees was rendered against defendant.

No challenges as to

the amount and extent of said lien have been made.
While it may be that plaintiffs trial counsel has no
standing to appeal

the attorney fee issue, AIbrechtsen does not

deny standing for purposes of appeal

in the instant action to a

named party.
Defendant, himself

an experienced

trial

attorney

and

present throughout all the proceedings at trial, represented on the
record that he w&s willing to work with plaintiffs counsel on the
matter of payment of fees, but has not.

To now allege that the

trial court erred and/or abused its discretion as it relates to due
process

and

the

memorandum

decision

of

May

11,

1992

is

inappropriate.
Dated the ___ 4th

day of

November

20

, 1992.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the ST&
-Z&7V
day of sS&
A&&^7J£&^
.
1992 I mailed a copies of the foregoing brief of p1aintiff/appei1ee
to Suzanne Benson, Esq., 455 East 500 South, #200, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111 and James Watts, Esq., 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84102.

21

Edwin F. Guycn - 1284
counsel for plaintiff
205 Newhcuse Building
3a!t Lake City, Utah
801/355-8811

84111

THIRD DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
TAMERA A. McDCNALD
plaintiff

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
FOR DECISION

vs.
ROBERT M. McDONALD

case no.
894901477 - DA
Judge Frank C. Noel

defendant
Notice

is hereby

given

that

defendant's

motion

to

dismiss, etc., served upon plaintiff February 4, 1992, is hereby
submitted for decision by the court.
Dated the

>-~~7-/ day of

^t^^f /C—

_ , 1992.

/'
l *-4fc

—

w £, C

Zl^—£

s

^-^

f

*<•

Edwin F. Guy on / counsel for plaintiff
I certify that on the above date a copy of the foregoing
net ice was mai1ed. f irst class, postage prepaid to Gl en M. Richman.
Esq., 60 South 600 East. £100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102.^

£2£22&=i

ttr^r?^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA A. MCDONALD,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Civil No. 894901447 DA

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

ROBERT M. MCDONALD,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Now

before

:

the

Court

are

plaintiff's

Objections

to

Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment.

The Court has reviewed the objections together with

the memos filed in support of and in response thereto and now
rules as follows:
The Court will make

it's ruling by reference to the

paragraph numbers contained in the document filed by plaintiff
entitled "Objections to Proposed Findings and Judgment".
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS:
1.

Plaintiff's objection is sustained.

2.

Plaintiff's objection is overruled.

3.

Plaintiff's objection is sustained.

4.

Plaintiff's objection is sustained.

previously

entered

findings

and

The Court has

conclusions

regarding
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jurisdiction and grounds for the divorce.
5.

Plaintiff's

objection

is

overruled.

The

finding,

that plaintiff argues should be included, has in substance been
incorporated below in paragraph 17 (g) of defendant's proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
OBJECTIONS TO MIXED FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS:
1.

As a general statement under this section the Court

agrees that there should not be a separate section entitled
"Mixed

Findings/Conclusions".

The matters

contained

in that

section should fall under the section entitled "Findings".

The

Court will refer specifically to paragraphs 14 through 17 of
defendant's proposed Mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as it appears that plaintiff is objecting to all of said
paragraphs.
Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Mixed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law should be deleted.
Paragraph 17 (i) should be deleted as being redundant.
Paragraph 17 (m) should be deleted as being a comment on
the evidence and not a finding of fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Plaintiff's objection to paragraph 9;2;4 is sustained.
Plaintiff's objection to paragraph 9;3;1 is sustained.
Plaintiff's
overruled.

objection

to

paragraph

12;8;9

to

11

is
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Plaintiffs objection to paragraph 14; 19; 1 et. seq. is
sustained.
OBJECTIONS TO DECREE:
1.

Plaintiff's objection is sustained.

2.

Said paragraph shall remain as written but with the

following addition:
"... or as the parties may agree."
3.

The Court sustains plaintiff's objections.

4.

The Court overrules plaintiff's objection.

5.

Plaintiff's objection is overruled.

6.

The Court sustains plaintiff's objection.

Counsel for defendant is to prepare new Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Decree consistent with this decision,
submit them to opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then
to the Court for signature.
DATED this

eft*
day of October, 1991.
FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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